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In the context of a research project concerned with contemporary cafés, 
one in which coffee-shops have loomed large, it has been appropriate to 
revisit Habermas’s famous 1962/1989 work on the transformation of the 
‘public sphere’, wherein the figure of the Early Modern English coffee-
house holds considerable significance. The outlines of Habermas’s claims 
are inspected, and three lines of critique – to do with spatiality, sociability 
and practices – are held up against his depiction of coffee-houses as 
relatively contained and egalitarian spaces of calm rational-critical 
debate. Theoretical work is combined with a re-reading of Habermas’s 
own fragmentary notes on the coffee-house, together with some 
borrowings from both secondary texts and republished primary sources. 
The chief aim is to develop critical materials to inform further inquiry into 
coffee-houses and similar establishments, past and present, as sites for the 
practical conduct of public life. 
 





In the place I most usually frequent, Men differ rather in the Time of Day in 
which they make a Figure, than in any real Greatness above one another. I, who 
am at the Coffee-house at Six in a Morning, know that my Friend Beaver the 
Haberdasher has a Levy of more undissembled Friends and Admirers, than most 
of the Courtiers or Generals of Great Britain. … Our Coffee-house is near one of 
the Inns of Court, and Beaver has the Audience and Admiration of his 
Neighbours from Six ’till within a Quarter of Eight, at which time he is 
interrupted by the Students of the House; some of whom are ready dressed for 
Westminster, at Eight in a Morning, with Faces as busie as if they were retained 
in every Cause there; and others come in their Night-Gowns to saunter away their 
Time, as if they never designed to go thither. … 
   When the Day grows too busie for these Gentlemen …, they give Place to Men 
who have Business or good Sense in their Faces, and come to the Coffee-house 
either to transact Affairs, or enjoy Conservation. … Of these sort of Men consist 
the worthier Part of Mankind; of these are all good Fathers, generous Brothers, 
sincere Friends, and faithful Subjects. Their Entertainments are derived rather 
from Reason than Imagination: Which is the Cause that there is no Impatience or 
Instability in their Speech or Action. … These are the Men formed for Society, 
and those little Communities which we express by the Word Neighbourhoods. 
   The Coffee-house is the Place of Rendezvous to all that live near it, who are 
thus turned to relish calm and ordinary Life. Ebulus presides over the middle 
Hours of the Day, when this Assembly of Men meet together. He enjoys a great 
Fortune handsomely, without launching into Expence; and exerts many noble and 
useful Qualities, without appearing in any publick Employment. His Wisdom and 
Knowledge are serviceable to all that think fit to make use of them; … . 
   Having here given an Account of the several Reigns that succeed each other 
from Day-break ’till Dinner-time, I shall mention the Monarchs of the Afternoon 
on another occasion, and shut up the whole Series of them with the History of 
Tom the Tyrant; who, as first Minister of the Coffee-house, takes the Government 
 4 
upon him between the Hours of Eleven and Twelve at Night, and gives his Orders 
in the most Arbitrary manner to the Servants below him, as to the Disposition of 
Liquors, Coal and Cinders. 
(in Ross 1982: 287-289) 
 
This is ethnography eighteenth-century style.  It is the abbreviated version of a piece 
that Richard Steele penned for The Spectator, the London-based satirical magazine 
that he founded in the early-1700s, and it captures the rhythms of a typical day spent 
in a busy coffee-house.  ‘Steele explores the social space of the coffee-house by 
charting the ebb and flow of customers through the day in Mr Spectator’s favourite 
coffee-house’ (Ellis 2001: 29), and we hear about the differing constituencies of 
coffee-drinker who arrive in this space at different hours, inscribing upon it their own 
distinctive ways of conversing, interacting and dwelling there.  Interestingly, these 
crowds vary in the extent to which their inhabitation of the space is ribald or 
mannered, and it might be argued that at root ‘Steele consciously revises the character 
of the coffee-house in his own reformative image’, such that ‘[i]n his vision the 
coffee-house becomes the ‘Place of Rendezvous to all … thus turned to relish calm 
and ordinary Life’’ (Ellis 2001: 29; see also Ellis 2004: 194-196).  This does not mean 
that he forgets about those for whom such ‘calm’ is largely absent, but it does mean 
that a preference is shown for those men – and he means men – whose 
‘Entertainments are derived rather from Reason than Imagination’.  Steele’s 
ethnography hence reveals a fundamental tension between the coffee house as ‘the 
Place of Rendezvous to all’, whatever their demeanour, and its population by those 
‘good Fathers, generous Brothers, sincere Friends, and faithful Subjects’ for whom 
the calm of reason should forever be the compass.  It will be seen that this tension is 
central to what follows. 
The context for the present paper is a research project concerned with the 
practical conduct of public life in contemporary cafés, one of our objectives being to 
use ‘ethno-archaeological’ (Laurier & Philo 2004) procedures in illuminating the 
commonplace practices through which specific social spaces occasion the routine 
accomplishment of an inclusive public life attentive to the needs of others.1  Our 
investigations are grounded in the situated courses of shared action that constitute 
what might be termed ‘habitable cities’, wondering with Thrift (2005) about the 
affective dimensions of inhabiting the spaces of such cities.  Within our project, 
coffee-shops, espresso bars and their like have loomed large, firstly for the 
contemporary significance of their growing presence across the cityscapes of Britain, 
Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the USA (Allegra 2005), and secondly 
for the historical importance of their emergence as a place of urban conviviality.  
There is a particular theoretical resonance here, moreover, in that what were once 
                                                           
1 ESRC funded project ‘The Cappuccino Community; cafés and civic life in the contemporary city’ 
(Reference No.R000239797). Further information about this project, including field reports and 
working papers, can be seen at www.geog.gla.ac.uk/~elaurier/dynamic/cafesite/.  
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called coffee-houses play a central role in Jürgen Habermas’s well-known text 
translated as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1989; 
henceforth ST).  In a companion paper we bring Habermas’s claims into direct contact 
with our empirical materials (Laurier & Philo 2005), while here we develop a three-
pronged critique – to do with spatiality, sociability and practice – trained on what we 
regard as Habermas’s reductive and theoretically over-stipulative treatment of located 
conversations in coffee houses.  We begin by outlining his version of the public 
sphere, and we extract what he says about the coffee-house as the exemplification of 
his theoretical concerns, and we insert a little extra historical evidence to flesh out 
connections that he implies but never expands.  We next examine critiques directed at 
his notion of the public sphere, and in the process rethink matters of spatiality, 
sociability and practice with a particular purchase on what he says about the coffee-
houses.  We then borrow from both secondary texts and republished primary sources 
to get closer to both the public sphere as an accomplishment and the life-world of 
these coffee-houses, the aim being to elucidate the emergent relations between coffee 
houses and publics (both in the plural). 
 
Habermas, the birth of the public sphere and the coffee-houses: an outline 
 
Habermas’s book was published in 1989, a translation into English of the German 
version published in 1962 (for commentary see Calhoun 1992a; Hill & Montag 
2000).2  He discusses the emergence of what he terms the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ 
from the late-seventeenth century in Western Europe, seeing this as the product of a 
middle-class dependent on its own endeavours for wealth-creation, rather than on 
inheritance and land-ownership.3  He defines this entity as ‘the sphere of private 
people come together as a public’ (ST, 27), locating it in a process whereby ‘private 
individuals’ – in the sense of individuals and their concerns for the affairs of family 
and hearth – acquired a collective character through orientating their attention to 
matters with a measure of generality ripe for debate at length with others.  The point 
is less that these individuals might hold positions of ‘power’ within society requiring 
them to take seriously matters of cultural and political concern, and more that they 
elected to do so, choosing to spend time with others in the mutual consideration of 
issues that in earlier centuries, arguably, they would not have tackled.  They now 
                                                           
2 The focus will be very much The Structural Transformation itself, and little attempt is made to relate 
it to later works by Habermas (eg. 1984, 1987) on the likes of the ‘ideal speech situation’, even though 
there is often a tendency to do so, sometimes to the detriment of taking seriously the historical-
empirical content found here but less so elsewhere in Habermas’s corpus (a point made by Hohendahl 
1992: esp.100-101). 
3 Habermas narrows his focus to ‘the liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere’, differentiating it 
from ‘the plebian public sphere’ associated with the French Revolution, ‘the Chartist movement and 
especially in the anarchist traditions of the workers’ movement on the continent’, even if in various 
ways this sphere ‘remains oriented towards the intentions of the bourgeois public sphere’ (ST: xviii). 
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entered into discourse4 with the expectation that their views, as crystallising out of the 
public debate to comprise what ‘public opinion’, would circulate and even have some 
‘consequence’ for the workings of state policy, domestic and foreign. 
This is the transformation of the public sphere at the heart of Habermas’s 
book.  It is a big story energised by grand theory, and a sizeable subtext is the extent 
to which this development was tied up with an extension of Enlightenment Reason, 
meaning the growing codification of rational principles in debate, inquiry and policy, 
throughout the social body (see also Calhoun 1992b: 17-18).  Upon introducing the 
‘basic blueprint’ of the bourgeois public sphere, for instance, Habermas insists that 
‘[t]he medium of this political confrontation,’ meaning private individuals collectively 
debating the basis for public authority over the likes of commodity exchange and 
social labour (see below), ‘was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s 
public use of their reason (offentliches Räsonnement)’ (ST: 27).  Repeated reference is 
made subsequently to ‘rational-critical public debate’ (eg. ST: 28), as the vehicle for 
the educated bourgeois public – the ‘bourgeois reading public’ (ST: 85) – to make its 
claims in the face of dominating power.  ‘The bourgeois public sphere 
institutionalised, according to Habermas, not just a set of interests and an opposition 
between state and society, but a practice of rational-critical discourse on political 
matters’ (Calhoun 1992b: 9).  In this rational arena, so the logic goes, a ‘general 
interest’ that ‘need not be distorted by particular interests’ is permitted to flourish, 
guaranteed by an agreed ‘rational approach to an objective order, that is to say, of 
truth’ (Calhoun 1992b: 9). 
The suggestion from Habermas is that an initial version of the public sphere 
appeared in the later-seventeenth century as a predominantly cultural-literary realm: 
the ‘public sphere in the world of letters’ (literarische Offentlichkeit).  Subsequently, 
and of most interest to Habermas, this development paved the way for the emergence 
of ‘the public sphere in the political realm’ (politische Offentlichkeit) during the later-
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth and beyond.  As he writes, ‘[t]he public 
sphere in the political realm evolved from the public sphere in the world of letters’ 
(ST: 30-31), and in the process created that realm of public opinion which, in a 
deceptively simple sense, he suggests ‘put the state in touch with the needs of society’ 
(ST: 31).  He elucidates ‘the historical and social location in which this self-
interpretation developed’ (ST: 85), meaning the times and spaces carrying the growth 
of this public opinion through which the bourgeoisie came to know (and to represent) 
itself and its cultural-political concerns.  Initially, it surfaced in the family home – as 
will be explained further in a moment – but it also flowed out into more public sites, 
as in ones where individuals could meet and discourse with one another outside of the 
                                                           
4 In what is effectively a gloss on Habermas’s claims, Sennett (1974: esp.81-82) emphasises the 
importance of speech, of rational discoursing, and a small part of his larger argument is that spaces like 
coffee-houses enabled a particular kind of ‘public speech’ to flourish away from the private intimacies 
of the home. 
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family home, notably the coffee-houses of London. 
Habermas discusses how during the seventeenth century ‘courtly-noble 
society’ gradually ‘became independent from the monarch’s personal sphere’, 
separating itself from the court (in the royal residences) and moving more to ‘the 
town’.  ‘[I]n town’, basically meaning London, the country’s capital, ‘[t]he bourgeois 
avant-garde of the educated middle class learned the art of critical-rational public 
debate’, precisely ‘through its contact with the ‘elegant world’’ (ST: 29) of this 
relocating courtly-noble society.  It is here, then, that Habermas first spells out the 
importance of coffee-houses and other public spaces, positioning them all as urban 
phenomena: 
 
The ‘town’ was the life centre of civil society not only economically; in 
cultural-political contrast to the court, it designated exactly an early public 
sphere in the world of letters whose institutions were the coffee houses, the 
salons, and the Tischgesellschaften (table societies). (ST: 30).5 
 
When discussing the British case, Habermas identifies a shift between court and town 
occurring after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ (the English Civil War and the removal, if 
temporarily, of the monarch).  The court became ‘the residence of secluded royalty, 
pointed out from afar, difficult of access save on formal occasions of proverbial 
dullness’ (ST: 32); and instead the locus of cultural life, and increasingly also that of 
political debate, shifted to the institutions of the town that supported the emergent 
public sphere (with its bourgeois underpinnings but ‘humanistic-aristocratic’ 
associations):6 
 
The predominance of the ‘town’ was strengthened by new institutions that, 
for all their variety, in Great Britain and France took over the same social 
functions: the coffee-houses in their golden age between 1680 and 1730 
and the salons in the period between regency and revolution. In both 
countries they were centres of criticism – literary at first, then also political 
– in which began to emerge, between aristocratic society and bourgeois 
intellectuals, a certain parity of the educated. (ST: 32) 
 
It is worth quoting at length a further extract where Habermas pursues empirical detail 
about London coffee-houses: 
 
                                                           
5 Habermas insists that there were important commonalities between and across the different public 
spaces mentioned here: ‘However much the Tischgesellschaften, salons and coffee-houses may have 
differed in the size and composition of their publics, the style of their proceedings, the climate of their 
debates, and their topical orientations, they all organised discussion among private people that tended 
to be ongoing; hence, they had a number of institutional criteria in common’ (ST: 36). Note the rather 
post-modern sounding reference here to publics, in the plural, which is potentially significant given 
certain ways in which he effectively downplays the differences between different clienteles of these 
spaces (wanting to stress a homogeneity to the emerging bourgeois public sphere, rather than 
identifying notable fractures in its constitution). See further discussion below.  
6 Note also Sennett’s (1974: 17) claim that: ‘As the cities grew, and developed networks of sociability 
independent of direct royal control, places where strangers might regularly meet grew up. … It was the 
era in which coffee-houses, cafés and coaching inns became social centres’. 
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Around the middle of the seventeenth century, after not only tea – first to 
be popular – but also chocolate and coffee had become the common 
beverages of at least the well-to-do strata of the population, the coachman 
of a Levantine merchant opened the first coffee house. By the first decade 
of the eighteenth century London already had 3,000 of them, each with a 
core group of regulars. Just as Dryden, surrounded by the new generation 
of writers, joined the battle of the ‘ancients and moderns’ at Will’s, 
Addison and Steele a little later convened their ‘little senate’ at Button’s; 
so too in the Rotary Club, presided over by Milton’s secretary, Marvell 
and Pepys met with Harrington who here probably presented the 
republican ideas of his Oceana. As in the salons where ‘intellectuals’ met 
with the aristocracy, literature had to legitimate itself in these coffee-
houses. In this case, however, the nobility joining the upper bourgeois 
stratum still possessed the social functions lost by the French; it 
represented landed and moneyed interests. Thus critical debate ignited by 
works of literature and art was soon extended to include economic and 
political disputes without any guarantee (such as was given in the salons) 
that such discussions would be inconsequential, at least in the immediate 
context. (ST; 32-33) 7 
 
Habermas actually says little more all that explicitly about the coffee-houses per se, 
but there is no doubt that any attempt to envisage what he means when talking about 
the rise of the public sphere is assisted by the image of those educated representatives 
of the bourgeois discoursing enthusiastically about the big issues of the day over 
steaming pots of coffee in these smoky spaces of public opinion-forming spread 
across town (see Figure 1).  Such, then, is the place of the coffee-houses, what one 
author once called the ‘penny universities’ (Ellis 1956: esp.Chap.9), in the fuller 
sweep of Habermas’s arguments (see also Howell 1993: 310). 
A large number of coffee-houses did diffuse across London’s cityscape, and 
Lillywhite (1963) provides both a timeline of their development – following from the 
opening in 1652 of Bowman’s coffee-house known as Pasqua Rose in St Michael’s 
Alley, Cornhill – and a register of the many hundreds of establishments operated from 
the seventeenth into the nineteenth centuries.  He demonstrates their progress from 
being regarded with suspicion, as in a Proclamation of 1675 calling for their 
suppression for being ‘places where the disaffected met’ (see also Ellis 2004: Chap.7), 
to being key vehicles ‘in the early postal development of London, which in time led to 
the organised delivery of letters, and the distribution of newspapers’ (Lillywhite 1963: 
18-19).  Habermas makes little of the connections with the post as a key element in 
spatially integrating ‘the public’ through reasonably assured vectors whereby citizens 
communicate with one another across physical distance, but the connection with 
                                                           
7Here Habermas draws upon a secondary history of literature and society in eighteenth-century 
London, two German-language works on the coffee-houses (1924 and 1958), and also an account of 
‘The clubs of London’ in the National Review (April, 1857, p.301) that neatly describes how ‘[e]very 
profession, trade, class, party, had its favourite coffee-house’. We will return shortly to this point about 
differentiation in the coffee-house world. 
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newspapers and the ‘journalistic’ construction of public opinion is considered (see 
also Ellis 2004: 68-74; Sennett 1974: 81).  Indeed, that the coffee-houses were linked 
together in a wider network stretching beyond in the individual nodes is itself 
empirically verifiable, as Habermas explains in a significant passage binding together 
several different elements of his account (notably sites such as coffee-houses with 
early forms of literary and political journalism): 
 
When Addison and Steele published the first issue of The Tatler in 1709, 
the coffee-houses were already so numerous and the circles of their 
frequenters already so wide, that contact among these thousandfold circles 
could only be maintained through a journal. At the same time the new 
periodical was so intimately interwoven with the life of the coffee houses 
that the individual issues were indeed sufficient basis for its 
reconstruction. The periodical articles were not only made the object of 
discussion by the public of the coffee houses but were viewed as integral 
parts of this discussion; this was demonstrated by the flood of letters from 
which the editor each week published a selection. When the Spectator 
separated from the Guardian the letters to the editor were provided with a 
special institution: on the west side of Button’s Coffee House a lion’s head 
was attached through whose jaws the reader threw his letter.8(ST: 42) 
 
This passage does indeed imply a London coffee-house society with some measure of 
overall cohesion, the patrons of these houses being bound together into a ‘society’ of 
sorts even though many of them would never meet each other personally, knowing 
only those who frequented the same coffee-houses as themselves.  The periodicals, 
the Tatler and the Spectator, arose within this society, reflecting its concerns, and 
expressly giving the impression of being written from coffee-house tables after 
coffee-house discussions.  At the same time, they circulated around the coffee houses, 
being bought there, often read there and then commonly the subject of debate there, 
comprising a satisfying homology between form and content (between personnel, 
spaces, networks and the contents of things up for discussion and even decision: see 
also Mackie 1998: 15-17). 
The first issue of The Tatler effectively set up the linkages between the coffee-
houses, the ‘political’ domain of rational-critical debate, and the emergence of a 
public sphere.  The magazine was published by one Isaac Bickerstaff, a pseudonym 
for Richard Steele, who provided this reasoning for his course of action: 
 
Tho’ the other Papers which are published for the Use of the good People 
of England have certainly very wholesome Effects, and are laudable in 
their particular Kinds, they do not seem to come up to the main Design of 
such Narrations, which, I humbly presume, should be principally intended 
for the Use of Politick Persons, who are so publick-spirited as to neglect 
their own Affairs to look into Transactions of State. (in Ross 1982: 65; 
                                                           
8Tellingly, ‘the Tatler expressly addressed the ‘worthy citizens who live more in a coffee house than in 
their shops’’ (in the Tatler, 17th May, 1709: see ST: Footnote 36: 260). 
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italics in original) 
 
Bickerstaff resolved to publish his ‘Advices and Reflections every Tuesday, Thursday 
and Saturday’, and, significantly, he decided to divide up the different sections of the 
magazine as if they were being written from different coffee-houses: 
 
All Accounts of Gallantry, Pleasure, and Entertainment, shall be under the 
Article of White’s Chocolate-house; Poetry, under that of Will’s Coffee-
house; Learning under the title of Graecian; Foreign and Dometick News, 
you will have from St. James’s Coffee-house; and what else I have to offer 
on any other Subject, shall be dated from my own Apartment. (in Ross 
1982: 65-66; italics in original) 
 
As Mackie (1988: 15-16) elaborates about the status of The Tatler, ‘[t]he paper’s 
design thus traces London’s social geography: its departments stand as newsprint 
analogues of actual places, public and private’.  Arguably, Habermas could have 
explored these linkages further in securing his own claims, particularly given how 
readily the likes of Mackie (1998: 17; see also Ellis 2004: 185-196; Sennett 1974: 80-
82, 222) conclude that it was precisely through the intersection of ‘institutions like the 
press and the coffee-house’ that ‘a new notion of the ‘public’ arose, one that was 
composed of private individuals who came together to debate and negotiate matters of 
public concern, to formulate ‘public opinion’’. 
 
Grounds of the public sphere: materials for a critique 
 
Writing in 1992, Benhabib instigated discussion about what can be termed the 
spatialities of the public sphere as understood by Habermas, and it is pertinent that 
she refers to Habermas as thinking in terms of ‘discursive public space’ (Benhabib 
1992: 73) or a ‘discourse model of public space’ (Benhabib 1992: 84).9  More 
                                                           
9 Benhabib counterposes Habermas to both Arendt and Ackerman in her rethinking of ST through the 
lens of public space, and much the same manoeuvre, explicitly drawing upon Arendt to spatialise the 
concerns of Habermas, can be found in Howell (1993), one of the few sustained treatments of ST by a 
geographer (see also Phillips 1995, esp.: 93-101). Howell (1993: 309-313) carefully deconstructs the 
tension in ST between ‘a normative ideal of popular, participatory political action’, boasting a supposed 
‘universality [of] … communicative rationality’, and ‘the particular, the local, … the specific’ 
circumstances, times and spaces – ‘the recognisable contexts, real problems, and moral situations’ – in 
which the historical model or spur for such a normative projection arose in the first place. He thereby 
introduces the fractures of empirical historical geography as a qualifier of the extent to which 
Habermas can or should generalise his notion of the public sphere away from certain corners of Early 
Modern Europe, and in so doing he also notes possible lines of attack by ‘an anti-foundationalist 
communitarian political theory’ or, indeed, by ‘a contextual social theory’. He resists the full 
implications of such a shift, nonetheless, preferring instead to use Arendt as a vehicle in an argument 
recovering broader principles of ‘something very like a public geography in which the fullest human 
action, that is to say, political action, can survive and flourish’ (Howell 1993: 318). Here, moreover, he 
gestures to how an Arendtian refashioning of Habermas in ST allows us to retrieve ‘a geography of ‘the 
small hidden islands of freedom’ [quoting Arendt]’, meaning a plurality of public spaces which might 
include – although Howell does not make the connection – the likes of coffee-houses, past and present. 
Such a vision is actually very close to our own, both here and elsewhere (Laurier & Philo 2005). 
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specifically, she proposes that: 
 
Public space is not understood … as a space of competition for acclaim 
and immortality among a political elite; it is viewed democratically as the 
creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and 
collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, 
stipulation and adoption. (Benhabib 1992: 87) 
 
We hope that this definition rings true given our brief exegesis above, but what we 
would now add is that her conception of public space remains somewhat 
metaphorical, only weakly specified in any relationship to the organisation and 
differentiation of spaces whereby people may actually meet to ‘have a say’ as 
members of the (or a) public.  For Benhabib, the spaces involved are to do with the 
enacting of ‘procedures’, the practising of a certain ‘democracy’ in who can go 
through with the practical action of arriving and then speaking to others, free as far as 
possible from any threat of violence, coercion or undue exertion of dominating power.  
By hinting a little more at the interlinked procedural and practice-based dimensions, 
Benhabib usefully inflects Habermas’s position in the direction of foregrounding 
practices in a fashion akin to what we favour (see below).  Yet the limited 
engagement with how spaces provide possibilities of habitation for new socio-
historical entities (such as ‘the public’) cannot be denied, despite, in the simplest of 
senses, it being easy to envisage mapping across from what Habermas means by the 
public sphere, perhaps via Benhabib’s first attempt at spatialising the concept, to the 
spaces of ‘mundane reason’ (Pollner 1987) present in, say, the coffee-house.  In his 
historical analysis, Habermas makes precisely the latter step, albeit without pausing to 
reflect on what he has done nor its possible implications; and hence our interest and 
the motivation for the present paper. 
What is clear, though, is that Habermas’s public sphere cannot – and should 
not – be mapped straightforwardly on to features of the city that are routinely 
categorised as, and in effect collected by, the idea of public space.  A key intervention 
is one by Montag (2000), who contrasts what Habermas means by the public sphere 
with how he deploys the figure of ‘the street’ in his 1962/1989 work.  Montag starts 
from a single sentence of Habermas’s: ‘Laws passed under the ‘pressure of the street’ 
could hardly be understood as embodying the reasonable consensus of publicly 
debating private persons’ (translated from the German in Montag 2000: 133).  What 
he concludes is that, for Habermas, the street is an unruly territory, a place of violent 
conflict consistently descending into the use of force to back up demands, and as such 
it departs from the peaceful spaces of the public sphere wherein the only force is that 
of the superior argument most thoroughly reasoned out for all present to hear, 
understand and (logically) accept.  ‘To speak from the street’, Montag (2000: 141) 
glosses, ‘is to speak from outside the public sphere’; it is ‘in no way an alternative 
public sphere’, for ‘it is precisely not a sphere of rational critique or even discussion 
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at all’.  The street and the public sphere are therefore fundamentally separate, even 
opposed, and ideally should be kept apart and devoid of mixing: ‘The freedom [that] 
rational critical debate enjoys within its own realm depends upon its scrupulous 
observance of this territorial imperative’ (Montag 2000: 141).  The street, thus 
conceived, stands as a semi-metaphoric, almost materialised counterpart to 
Habermas’s public sphere, and the image does present itself of the coffee-house, 
notably in its eighteenth-century guise, as the home of a calm public sphere removed 
from the churning irrationality of the street outside.  What, though, is it about the 
street that prevents debate and reasonable consensus?  In response, and as we briefly 
elaborate later, we might answer that it is simply too filled with flows, too open to 
interruption and disruption, too uncontrolled and it offers no place for rest and 
conversation beyond the stray shout.  While all of society might be there in the street, 
they can in no way do all of the things that a community requires; and so what the 
spatial ordering of the coffee-house was offering at its moment of emergence, 
Habermas reminds us, is an architecture for extended good conversation amongst non-
family members. 10 
Noting the exact location of Habermas’s emerging public sphere in only 
certain new spaces brings us to a persuasive claim recently made by Bartolovich 
(2000).  In a dense text, drawing upon postcolonial critiques of the ‘localism’ within 
famous works of cultural theory, Bartolovich (see also Eley 1992) questions the 
extent to which Habermas’s public sphere tends to be conceptualised as emergent 
with the space of a nation-state, largely untouched by interactions with ‘others’ 
elsewhere.  ‘Habermas suggests that historically a ‘public’ forms itself ‘within’ and in 
relation to a particular ‘bourgeois constitutional state’’ (Bartolovich 2000: 15, 
emphasis in original), and that there is a ‘diffusionist’ logic – a ‘tidy one-way 
diffusionism’ – whereby the public sphere spreads from ‘its ur-form [in] the northern 
and western European nation-state territories’ to ‘the ‘belated states’ of Italy, 
Germany and elsewhere (Bartolovich 2000: 17).  Instead, Batolovich (2000: 17) 
argues that ‘the supposedly originary and autonomous European public spheres may 
have been ‘stimulated from outside’ as well’, insisting on the ‘transnational’ character 
of the processes at work here.  The details of her account need not detain us, but of 
moment is her insight into ‘this problem of the production of the space of ‘the public 
sphere(s)’, proposing that, ‘to understand the operation of its logic of 
inclusion/exclusion, we need to understand what I will call here its ‘geo-graphy’ – the 
writing of the world on which it depends’ (Bartolovich 2000: 16, emphasis in 
original).  In short, we must be critical of representations depicting the public sphere 
as dependent upon simple, contained and (en)closed material spaces, when much 
                                                           
10 Intriguingly, Sennett (1974: 84-85) argues that the later-eighteenth century street, or more generally 
outdoors public space, threatened or at least could not sustain the ‘public speech’ of coffeehouse life, 
precisely because it allowed too much ‘open encounter’, lending scant structure to sporadic and chance 
meetings in which conversations could not be anything but snatched and superficial. 
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evidence implies that such spaces were really much more complex, porous and 
fragmentary, criss-crossed by all manner of peoples, ideas, ‘forces’ and ‘impurities’ 
(Bartolovich 2000: 19; see also Howell 1993: 310).  This being said, while 
Bartolovich’s critique reminds us that the ‘geo-graphy’ of the public sphere is not 
neatly contained but a fluid space of multiple encounters, what it does not supply is a 
solution to the problem of how the public is made possible when a continual through-
flow of people would seemingly push it to the point of dissolution.  The question then 
returns for us as to how the coffee house does provide, as a practical solution, a 
pocket of pleasurable order, a patch of convivial stability in the potentially liquifying 
and anonymising movement of peoples, ideas and materials?  If Foucault (eg. 1970) 
has taught us anything in his general histories, it is that Reason, knowledge or indeed 
the public sphere cannot be universal constants guaranteeing the onward movement of 
total histories. 
Rethinking the public sphere as a course of action rather than an over-arching 
grid is closely bound up with re-examining what might be claimed about the 
particular form of sociability upon which it allegedly depended.  Habermas states that 
the public sphere ‘preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing 
the equality of status, disregarded status altogether’ (ST: 37).  Social standing, 
political influence and economic power were dismissed from the historical public 
sphere as irrelevances, so Habermas supposes, in that the force of the superior 
argument was all that would ‘carry the day’, rather than physical force, rank or 
judicial machinery.11  In other words, the form of sociability envisaged here was 
egalitarian, the implication being less a total homogeneity in who contributed to the 
emerging discourse of public opinion, more a sense of enlarging possibilities for all 
sorts of people, from varying backgrounds, to be contributing to the critical-rational 
debate.12  Unsurprisingly, critics have taken Habermas to task on precisely this 
assumption, rendering him ‘vulnerable to charges of ethnocentricism, sexism and 
abstraction’ (Howell 1993: 311).  Fraser’s (1992) brilliant critique summarises much 
that is at stake: 
 
… scholars like … Landes [1988], … Ryan [1992] and … Eley [1992] 
                                                           
11 This attribution or self-image of the scrupulously egalitarian coffee-house ties in with what 
Habermas argues about ‘the principle of universal access’ to the public sphere, and he speculates that 
this sphere was taken as ‘public’ in the strict sense that ‘all human beings belong to it’, or ought to be 
able to belong to it provided that certain conventions of rational argumentation were followed (see ST: 
esp.85). This claim is also at the heart of what Sennett (1974: esp.81-82) argues about the coffee-
houses, in that he depicts ‘[c]offee-house speech [a]s the extreme case of … a sign system of meaning 
divorced from – indeed in defiance of – symbols of meaning like rank, origins, taste, all visibly at 
hand’. ‘Distinctions of rank’ were ‘temporarily suspended’, then, and ‘[p]eople acted ‘as if’ the 
differences between themselves did not exist – for the moment’ (Sennett 1974: 322). 
12 He nonetheless admits to idealising this apparent egalitarian sociability: ‘Not that this idea of the 
public was actually realised in earnest in the coffee houses, the salons and the societies; but as an idea 
it had become institutionalised and thereby stated as an objective claim. If not realised, it was at least 
consequential’ (ST: 36).  
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contend that Habermas’s account idealises the liberal public sphere. They 
argue that, despite the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, the official 
public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number 
of significant exclusions. For Landes, the key axis of exclusion is gender; 
she argues that the ethos of the new republican public sphere in France 
was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of a more woman-friendly 
salon culture that the republicans stigmatised as ‘artificial’, ‘effeminate’ 
and ‘aristocratic’. … Extending Landes’s argument, …Eley contends that 
exclusionary operations were essential to liberal public spheres not only in 
France but also in England and Germany, and that in all these countries 
gender exclusions were linked to other exclusions rooted in processes of 
class formation. … [T]he elaboration of a distinctive culture of civil 
society and of an associated public sphere was implicated in the process of 
bourgeois class formation; its practices and ethos were markers of 
‘distinction’ in … Bourdieu’s sense, ways of defining an emergent elite, of 
setting it off from the older aristocratic elites it was intent on displacing on 
the one hand and from the various popular and plebian strata it aspired to 
rule on the other. (Fraser 1992: 114).13 
 
There is much to note about this passage, including a different take on the relationship 
between aristocratic and bourgeois factions to that implied by Habermas, as briefly 
covered above, but the chief message is that the ‘actually existing’14 public sphere – 
that approximating Habermas’s conceptualisation – was fractured by exclusionary 
lines scratched in the sands of social distinction.15  Moreover, Fraser (1992: 115) 
speculates about the existence of ‘other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing public 
spheres’, and thereby makes the decisive move to pluralising Habermas’s singular 
public, writing instead about multiple publics.  The studies on which she draws show 
that ‘the bourgeois public was never the public’, and that ‘virtually contemporaneous 
with the bourgeois public sphere there arose a host of competing counterpublics, 
including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics and 
working-class publics’ (Fraser 1992: 116; see also Aronowitz 2000; Daniel 2000; 
                                                           
13 Fraser offers further points about the public-private divide, powerfully theorising that gendered 
separation of the public and private spheres, the latter increasingly mapped on to the home spaces of 
domestic(ated) femininity, which is now a staple of feminist geography (eg. Bondi & Domosh 1998, as 
see pp.275-276 in this paper for some specific comments on Habermas’s claims in ST). 
14 Fraser repeatedly uses the term ‘actually existing’, indicating her wish to consider what might be the 
empirical referents for or correlates of Habermas’s more abstract claims about the public sphere. 
Herein also lies her appeal to ‘new revisionist historiographies’, meaning work by the likes of Eley, 
Landes and Ryan, boasting a rich empirical basis to hold up against Habermas’s theoretically-driven 
narrative. 
15 In class terms, Habermas does admit that de facto criteria for admission to the public sphere, 
depending on education, could not fail to hinge as well on economic position: ‘for formal education at 
that time was more a consequence than a precondition of social status, which in turn was primarily 
determined by one’s title to property’ (ST: 85). This was also a split of sorts between town and country, 
not just because the public spaces involved were predominantly urban-based, but also because the mass 
of the people in both towns but particularly the countryside were still woefully poorly educated: thus, 
‘[i]n relation to the mass of the rural population and the common ‘people’ in towns, … the public ‘at 
large’ that was being formed diffusely outside the early institutions of the public was still extremely 
small’ (ST: 37). 
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Giroux 2000).  Once this move has been made, an additional consideration is exactly 
when and where these counterpublics came into being, prompting questions about 
how the bourgeois public sphere as a course of conduct immediately, rhythmically or 
belatedly produces supplements, variations, alliances, splinters, opposition and 
indifference. 
Now that the conjoint spatialities and sociabilities of the public sphere have 
been shown to be less than guaranteed by a transcendental theory of Reason and 
rational inquiry, so attention can also turn to the practices reckoned to be constitutive 
of this sphere on a daily basis.  Habermas has little to say about practices as such, the 
effect being a somewhat disembodied account in which the results of writing and 
speaking are prioritised above what doing being members of the public sphere might 
involve.  There is some sense of the former, with the public sphere often appearing as 
a highly ‘literary’ endeavour, but the reader is told little about the routines of 
bourgeois men moving around the townscape, perhaps walking or perhaps by 
carriage, meeting, sitting down together, gesturing, laughing, sighing, lifting food or 
drink to their mouths, talking to waiting staff, and so on.  The reader might start to 
imagine these practices, the conduct of which cannot but be central to the 
accomplishment of anything resembling a public sphere, but they remain stubbornly 
absent from Habermas’s own text.  There are two issues here, the first being the 
empirical one that actual practices in the sorts of spaces wherein Habermas’s public 
sphere arises – notably the coffee-houses – might depart considerably from the calmly 
ordered world of educated heads eloquently discoursing with one another, clearly 
separated from the street, which permeates his text at various points.  There may be 
far more slamming down of mugs, shouting, fisticuffs and more embodied forms of 
persuasion, and more generally there may be many respects in which the disruptions 
and interruptions of the streets and the taverns intrude upon the socio-spaces of the 
public sphere.  Appreciating the plenitude of action and procedural problems 
associated with Habermas’s public sphere is hence crucial to a recovery of the 
practices in play: practices that ‘can define briefly and locally, what it is all about’ 
(Latour, 1998, p197) from, whispered conversations, loud arguments, the comings 
and goings of countless different people and groupings across the threshold of this 
public sphere. 
The second issue, following on, is more theoretical, and ties in with how 
Habermas might be subjected to a critique – it could be dubbed ethno-archaeological16 
– for leaving covered over the arrays of practices, stumbled or shrieked conversations 
                                                           
16 It would also be easy to register a non-representational theory (NRT) critique of Habermas for so 
obviously prioritising the cognitive-driven, calmly-reflected upon rational-critical deliberations of 
those private individuals ‘making’ the public sphere. Our critique is more ethnomethodological, 
though, in part because we do not draw a hard and fast distinction between embodied practices and 
snatched conversations, the latter usually being totally enmeshed in a near-instantaneous flow of 
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included, that sometimes constituted, differed from, or at least supplemented, what is 
glossed as the polite conduct of rational-critical debate.  Polite conduct itself is not 
enough to constitute reasoned argument, and indeed is often at odds with arguing as it 
is actually done.  It is true that Benhabib (1992) configures Habermasian public space 
as one shaped by certain procedural ‘rules’ of discursive practice, in which case the 
focus on discourse is coupled with a weak notion of practice.17  It is also true that 
McCarthy (1992: esp.51-52) gives a lengthy disquisition on Habermas’s conception 
of ‘practical discourse’, which refers here to a sense that reasoning has to be situated – 
it, literally, has to take place somewhere – even if it always remains in tension with 
‘the transcendence of situatedness required by his model of rational consensus’ (also 
Howell 1993).  Such a reference to practical discourse still does not allow that rules 
and reason are embedded in ordinary practices of rule-following and reasoning, 
however, and, if anything, the tension that McCarthy identifies between situatedness 
and transcendence goes to the heart of what we find problematic about much of 
Habermas’s corpus down the years.  ‘Whereas ethnomethodology and its cognate 
disciplines are interested in the situated production of intelligible utterances and 
actions – ie. in how participants apprehend the world –’, observes Bogen (1989: 53; 
italics in original), the ideology-critique work of Habermas ‘is devoted to the 
identification and specification of participants’ systematic misapprehensions’ (as 
measured against what they ideally should have known).18  While The Structural 
Transformation is arguably less concerned with ideology critique than is much of 
Habermas’s later writing, it would be pushing things to suggest that he is especially 
concerned here with the local-historical production of ‘apprehension’ amongst 
complexes of materials and human actions, by and for his private individuals, in the 
course of making an Early Modern public sphere.  The practices, the conversations 
included, hence remain somewhat obscure, assumed but largely unquestioned, leaving 
a lacunae at the heart of his text that requires shoring up by his transcendental theory.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
conduct and encounter (see also Laurier, 1999). NRT seems unsure about what to do with conversation, 
since it still seems just too representational (see Harrison, 2005). 
17 In a different register, Sennett (1974: esp.79-82) draws links between performance and speech: 
‘Using the same examples [as Habermas] of newspapers and coffee-houses, Sennett points not to 
rational rules of public discourse, but to the performative aspects of communication in these places. 
Speakers from different social classes adopted the conventions of the theatre in their verbal expression 
and bodily presentations. Rhetoric and the dramatisation of difference were made possible by the 
adoption of common, artificial modes of speech and action’ (Bridge 2004: 133-134). Such an insertion 
of performance into Habermas’s problematic certainly has parallels with what we are attempting here. 
18 See also Bridge’s (2004: esp.133-136) ingenious recasting of the universalised sense of rationality 
found in ST, and more broadly in Habermas’s notion of the ‘ideal speech situation’, as he strives 
instead to conjoin the likes of Sennett (1974), de Certeau (1984) and others in a recovery of the 
‘strategic rationalities’ arising at particular moments in particular places (‘speech places’) dispersed 
across the ‘unsettled city’. Such rationalities do possess a measure of stability realised in how people 
more-or-less successfully ‘signal’ to one another, not necessarily though the ‘portentous 
communication’ of Reason, but still in such a way that ‘rational’ choices of how to proceed become 
possible if transient and local. His work (see also Bridge 2005) is another thread paralleling our own 
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Pushed to its limits, this critique might even declare Habermas’s whole approach to 
the public sphere misguided, proposing that the only way to advance a plausible 
inquiry into Early Modern ‘public life’ should commence by returning to the rough 
ground of embodied practices and vulgar conversation. 
 
Burnt beans at the Early Modern coffee-houses 
 
In his impressive recent scholarship, to which we are indebted, Ellis (2001, 2002, 
2004) patiently and painstakingly uncovers the architectures, ambiences and crowds 
of the eighteenth-century coffee-houses, thereby rebuking Habermas for a lack of 
empirical-historical detail in his treatment of these sites upon which so much 
theoretical weight comes to bear.  More specifically, Ellis critiques Habermas for 
basing much of his interpretation on the uncritical, often nostalgic histories of the 
coffee-houses given by earlier writers such as Macaulay and Stephen – as also 
deconstructed by Ellis – and for undertaking no primary research of his own.19  Ellis 
hence detects a failure to engage with the substance of arguments, boasts, exposures, 
deals, stories, gossip and jokes as they must have been played out, again and again, 
between all manner of coffee-house customers in order to ‘deliver’ the polite clientele 
in enlightened exchange.  Although it is hard to recover with any certainty the micro-
dynamics involved here, Ellis shows that a careful use of primary sources such as 
Steele’s ‘ethnography’ may allow something approaching an ethno-archaeological 
glimpse of public city life as lived in these historically distant social spaces.  Drawing 
upon his work, supplemented with other inputs, we now reflect upon the entangled 
spaces, societies and practices of London’s Early Modern coffee-houses. 
Considering the spaces of these establishments, it is possible first to look at 
what Ellis says about the arrangement of these spaces, following his notes about their 
‘physical architecture’ – often dominated by a long table that customers shared, 
although coffee-houses with more separated-out ‘bays’ were also common – and 
about how ‘the space of the coffee-house confirmed and established the kinds of 
sociability found there’ (Ellis 2002: 4).  Indirectly offering support for Habermas, 
Ellis (2004: 59) writes as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
work here, although we are more hesitant about his retention of rationality as a key construct, even if 
mobilised in this modest form. 
19 ‘As a student of his footnotes realises, Habermas appears to have used their research [that of the 
nineteenth-century historians] to formulate his own account of the coffee-house, a reliance that is, in 
the end, rather significant. Habermas relied on a restricted range of generalist secondary texts on the 
English coffee-house: making reference to English research by Stephen, Trevelyan and an anonymous, 
untraced popular historian, and two German works (both of which are heavily dependent on the 
nineteenth-century research of Timbs and Robinson. It is likely he did no primary research. It is, of 
course, unsurprising that Habermas’s work on the coffee-house is under-researched (the work the book 
does is theoretical, as is appropriate in a Habilitationsschrift, or post-doctoral dissertation, submitted to 
a philosophy department). However, the manner in which his research is weak is central to the success 
of his argument (Ellis 2001: 44-45). 
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Arriving in the coffee-house, customers were expected to take the next 
available seat, placing themselves next to whoever else has come before 
them. No seat could be reserved, no man might refuse your company. This 
seating policy impresses on all customers that in the coffee-house all are 
equal. … From the arrangement of the chairs, the coffee-house allowed 
men who did not know each other to sit together amicably and expected 
them to converse. In the anonymous context of the city, in which most 
people are unknown to each other, this sociable habit was astonishing. 
 
The implication is that the coffee-houses were indeed spaces of equality, although it is 
evident that this equality was more an ideal than a reality, as Ellis acknowledges at 
many points and as we will examine shortly.  In Habermas’s vision, moreover, the 
coffee-house debaters would have to sit down in a relatively organised fashion, with a 
clear stability about who is present and contributing, whereas the evidence – as in the 
opening ethnography of Steele’s, and as comes alive throughout Ellis’s work – 
suggests a much more transient scene, with a constant stream of comings and goings 
through the coffee-house entrance. 
Steele’s account also reminds us that different groupings of men, boasting 
quite particular backgrounds, occupations, interests and the like, tended to congregate 
in the same coffee-house at different hours, one upshot of which might have been less 
discoursing between different groupings than envisaged in the Habermasian model.  A 
coffee-house’s internal social spaces were likely re-organised over the course of a 
day, arguably lacking the continuity and universality demanded by Habermas, a point 
on which Ellis (2004: 150-151) elaborates by considering the wider spatiality of the 
coffee-houses as linked to the occupational, professional and recreational geographies 
of the city:  
 
Many of the specialised allegiances between coffee-houses and interest were 
determined by architecture and geography. The routines of everyday life in 
court and chambers brought lawyers, law students and clerks back to the same 
establishments located in clusters near the Inns of Courts: both Nandos and the 
Grecian were noted for their legal flavour. In different periods, Child’s Coffee-
House neat St Paul’s Cathedral attracted clergymen, whereas the Chapter 
Coffee-House, nearby in Paternoster Row, was the haunt of booksellers and 
printers, and the hack writers they employed. Merchants, insurance agents and 
brokers met at Jonathan’s and Garraway’s coffee-houses in Exchange Alley. 
… For wits and poets and important concentration of coffee-houses emerged 
in Russell Street, a broad street leading off the crowded piazza of Civent 
Garden, close to the theatres. The first of these was Will’s Coffee-House … 
(Ellis 2004: 150-151) 
 
Ellis (2004: Chap.11) shows the quite specific coffee-house worlds that grew up 
around the merchants, who clearly did conclude significant transactions in the coffee-
houses, notably those neighbouring the Exchange which ‘became an extension of the 
trading floor …, offering a warm and dry place where business could continue after 
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the official hours had finished’ (Ellis 2004: 169).  He does the same for the 
‘scientists’, stating that other coffee-houses ‘proved to be a remarkably hospitable 
habitat for the New Science’ (Ellis 2004: 163), and also for the ‘philosophers’ (Ellis 
2004: Chap.12), although in both of the latter cases he acknowledges that many 
contemporaries regarded the science and philosophy under debate in the coffee-
houses to be a pale imitation of the real intellectual advances associated with 
Enlightenment Europe (eg. Ellis 2004: 165, 198-203).  As implied, moreover, there 
was a definite geography to the coffee-houses frequented by these different 
constituencies, and Ellis (2004: 189-190) notes that the refined coffee-houses 
preferred by Steele – and hence those that most closely approximated Habermas’s 
vision – were ‘reflected topographically: all were located in the socially exclusive 
West End of London’.  By extension, the remainder, occupying many other locations 
spread across the city, departed considerably from the ideal. 
These observations have been at once about the spaces and the crowds of the 
coffee-house, but we can now say a few things more narrowly about the entangled 
societies occupying these indelibly social spaces.  Habermas’s over-reliance on 
uncritical histories of the coffee-house, as opposed to being more immersed in 
primary evidence, risks him seriously overplaying both the homogeneity of the 
coffee-house polite crowd – it becomes as massed, uniform, singular and rhetorical as 
the rabble crowd on the streets – and missing the extent to which many of the 
differences composing it involved people, groups and factions who were certainly not 
always polite, civilised and urbanely sociable to all others.  Ellis (2002: 37) proposes 
that the sociabilities of the coffee-house were indeed much more mixed, not just in the 
sense of hosting the different constituencies just mentioned – the merchants, 
scientists, philosophers, and so on – but also quite a few ‘counter-cultural’ elements 
(recalling earlier comments about ‘counter-publics’): 
 
A diverse array of figures articulate this counter-culture coffee-house, 
amongst whom might be numbered the gambler and card-shark, the 
drunkard duellist, the projector (a promoter of mad-cap schemes), the 
philosopher and literary critic (given to extreme opinions), the buttonholer 
(one who literally seizes the observer by the buttonhole, in order to secure 
undivided attention) and the coffee-woman. 
 
Ellis thus finds heterogeneous crowds, urban characters picked out amongst the 
throng, whose social and spatial dynamics were far more complex than those 
pictured in the polite Habermasian coffee-house.  He delights in recounting tales of 
drunkenness, gambling, debauchery, lewdness and sexual encounters occurring in 
many of the less salubrious coffee-houses – little different from the taverns – as 
representatives of the ‘low’ classes came into contact with their supposed ‘betters’ 
(precisely not over a steaming coffee-pot for a debate on the pressing matters of the 
day).  For instance, when drawing upon a 1740s tract about Moll Long and her 
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King’s Coffee-House in Convent Garden, Ellis (2001: 36) describes a ‘coffee-house 
… transgressive not only because of its character as a place of resort for the sexual 
underworld, but also for its promiscuous mixture of high and low status groups’.20  
To put it another way, this coffee-house was Hogarthian, being illustrated in one of 
Hogarth’s plates, embracing ‘a boisterous sociability equated with promiscuity, 
tumult and poverty: a carnivalised sociability, more popular than polite’ (Ellis 2001: 
37).  Ellis (2001: 73) duly concludes that it ‘is clearly a different sort of coffee-house 
from that celebrated in its Habermasian model, with a significantly different and 
more subversive regime (boisterous, sexually promiscuous, heterosexual, status-
obsessed and heterodox)’.21 
On the question of the constitution of the public, and relatedly of its opinions, 
it should be obvious from much said already that, for all the impulses towards 
egalitarianism, those coffee-houses most akin to Habermas’s model, and as preferred 
by someone like Steele, were relatively elite affairs wherein education, if not class or 
status per se, was a necessary accoutrement for attending.  Furthermore, in response 
to the obvious gender-insensitivity of Habermas’s account, Ellis (2002: 9) stresses 
‘the fact that the early coffee-house was not open to women in the same way as it 
was to men’ (p.9).22  An implicit rule served to exclude women, ‘[t]here [being] no 
need formally to exclude them because it was assumed that no woman who wished to 
be considered virtuous and proper would want to be seen in a coffee-house’ (Ellis 
2004: 66).  The kinds of topics debated in the coffee-house, ‘science, commerce, 
politics’, ones demanding the kind of education, knowledge and experience only 
open to men at the time, ‘established it as a space for men and men only’.  Ellis 
(2004: 67) goes so far as to suggest that, compared to other social spaces in a city 
like eighteenth-century London (the parks, playhouses, pleasure-gardens: cf. Ogborn 
1998), ‘coffee-houses were almost more than anywhere else male-orientated, 
gendered, almost exclusively masculine’.  In fact, some coffee-houses did contain 
women, but as serving staff or even as owners (especially widows),23 and in this 
                                                           
20 Note the theme of transgressive mixings that features in the famous Stallybrass and White (1986) 
text, the coffee-houses being seen as one site for such mixings. To reiterate the point from the main 
text, this mixing would almost certainly not have arisen in the context of the refined debate that 
Habermas privileges as the egalitarian achievement of the public sphere. 
21 The text drawn upon here by Ellis dwells on the so-called ‘flash’ spoken by Moll with her 
customers: this being ‘an underground criminal lexicon which the text examines in a witty dialogue 
composed of almost impenetrable cant terms and phrases’ (Ellis 2001: 37).  Such a language, a highly 
embodied form of talk with scant connection to the ‘philosophical’ discourses of the Age of Reason, 
provides another neat instance of disconnection from the elite discoursing on which the Habermasian 
public sphere depended. 
22 To be fair, Habermas (ST: 32) does acknowledge ‘that only men were admitted to coffee-house 
society … . Accordingly the women of London society, abandoned every evening, waged a vigorous 
but vain struggle against the new institution’. The latter remark – see also ST: Note 11, 257 – refers to 
the 1674 ‘Women’s Petition against Coffee’, not least because it was thought that excessive coffee-
drinking was making their menfolk ‘as unfruitful as the deserts’ (in Lillywhite 1963: 17). 
23 Perhaps repeating the ambiguous status of the ‘mistresses’ who ran the male-dominated salons or 
conversaziones so central to Enlightenment life (certainly in continental Europe). 
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respect Ellis (2002: 10; also Ellis 2001: 30-31) teases out the gendered organisation 
of the spaces involved: 
 
This reminds us that the much-vaunted equality of the coffee-house only 
applied to its customers: and the coffee-house was subject to important 
social divisions and boundaries. Images of the coffee-house record two 
significant hierarchies: one of status dividing the workers from the 
customers, and another of gender, excluding all women but the coffee-
women from the coffee-room. The spatial organisation of the room 
reinforces the hierarchical and gendered structure of the coffee-house: the 
boys inhabit the space around the table, while the women proprietor is 
separated off from the customers in her little booth. 
 
Intriguingly, in August 1709 a new periodical called The Female Tatler made a brief 
appearance, in effect accepting that women – at least respectable women – should 
not be patronising coffee-houses, and the author declared that she would ‘date all my 
advices from own apartment, which comprehends, White’s, Will’s, the Frecian, 
Garraway’s, in Exchange Alley, …’ (in Mackie 1998: 131).  The image of this 
woman writing The Female Tatler while gazing out of her apartment window at the 
male-dominated coffee-houses is most instructive, as too was her wish to ‘tattle’, 
‘since tattling was ever adjudg’d peculiar to our sex’, and hence ‘to prate a little to 
the town’ about sundry matters, events, fashions, scandals, woes and vices.  The 
exclusion of women from the rational-critical debate of the public sphere, certainly in 
its Habermasian guise, is thereby most tangibly marked, although a more positive 
claim would be that the likes of The Female Tatler reveal the shadowy outlines of 
(one of) Fraser’s (1992) woman’s counter-publics. 
When turning more explicitly to the practices in the coffee-houses, we can 
begin with the anonymous author of a Restoration tract who talks about the 
‘phanatique theatre’ of a typical coffee-house, one full of ‘strange beasts’: 
 
The Room stinks of Tobacco worse than hell of Brimstone, and is as full of 
smoak as their Heads that frequent it, whose humours as those of Bedlam 
and their discourse oft-times as Heathenish and dull as their Liquor; that 
Liquor, which by its look and taste, you may reasonably guess to be 
Pluto’s Diet-drink [another name for coffee]. (in Mackie 1998: 138) 
 
The reference to ‘Bedlam’ is instructive, since this was the most notorious lunatic 
asylum of the age (Philo 2004: esp.Chap.6), very much a space of unreason, certainly 
not reason.  Edward Ward’s text, The London Spy, published in eighteen monthly 
instalments from November 1698 to May 1700, has the following to say about Will’s 
Coffee-House, which was supposedly to become one of the most refined places of 
resort for the ‘philosophers’: 
 
[It contains] a parcel of muddling muckworms … as busy as so many rats 
in an old cheese-loft; some going, some going, some scribbling, some 
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talking, some drinking, others jangling, and whole room stinking of 
tobacco like a Dutch scoot, or a boatswain’s cabin. … Being half-choked 
with the steam that arose from their soot-coloured ninny-broth, their 
stinking breaths and the suffocated fumes of their nasty puffing-engines, 
my friend and I paid for our Muhammadan gruel [again meaning coffee] 
and away we came (in Mackie 1998: 144, 148) 
 
Mackie comments on the window opened here on to a space of embodied practices, 
rather than detached discoursing.  Indeed, he talks about Wards’s ‘Spy’ revelling in 
‘the carnivaleque life of the London streets, shops, coffee-houses, taverns, brothels 
and baths’: 
 
The pictures Ward draws of London life are marked by hyperbole, and 
aggressively ‘low’ style, and an almost obsessive occupation with the 
sensory world. Where Bickerstaff and the Spectator seem all eyes, 
Ward’s Spy engages in the full repertoire of the senses – sight and 
hearing certainly, but also the more directly palpable perceptions of taste, 
touch and smell. … [T]he whole mood of the experience is different. The 
feeling of immersion in the smoke and soot, the sheer strength of the 
sensations … . (in Mackie 1998: 144). 
 
Mackie (1998: 137) suggests that the effect ‘contrasts sharply with the picture that 
historical social theorists like … Habermas draw of the coffee-house as a place of 
rational and genteel discourse’, portraying indeed an environment that was indeed 
anything but the calm home of rational-critical debate.  Ellis (2001: 37) agrees: 
 
… the coffee-house was often anything but quiet, polite and business-
like, and, moreover, that this disputatious simulation was a signal source 
of the customer’s interest in attending the coffee-house. The unruly 
element was described in terms of babble, noise and smokiness, 
argument and faction. 
 
Here, therefore, is not the quiet and contemplative polite crowd, but something 
noisier, more a cacophony of competing voices than a restrained turn-taking; 
something more quarrelsome, more Rabelasian, more akin to the cast of eccentrics, 
perverts and money-grabbers apparently found on the streets than the occupants 
assumed to ornament the interiors of the Age of Reason.  Elsewhere, Ellis (2004: 62-
53) underlines the perceived ‘noise’ of the coffee-house, an ‘aural landscape [that] 
was a complex mixture of human voices and clattering busyness’, and he recalls one 
satirist’s description of it as ‘an unintelligible buzzing’ that commonly ‘degenerated 
into squabble and conflict, precisely because there were no polite limits’. 
Intriguingly, Ward’s Spy comments on visiting the coffee-house looking for 
inspiration from ‘the powerful eloquence which drops from the silver tongues of the 
ingenious company that frequent this noted mansion’, but what he found there – to his 
surprise – was ‘much company, but little talk’, with the men there present remaining 
largely silent as if hoping thereby ‘to be counted a man of judgement’ (in Mackie 
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1998: 437).  The men were probably less silent per se, however, more that they 
refrained from offering commentaries on weighty matters that might reveal their true 
ignorance.  More common, so the evidence implies, was for the coffee-houses to be 
far from silent, as just noted, and in practice to be very noisy, full to the rafters with 
what might be judged as relatively idle conversation, not serious discoursing.  Ellis 
(2004: 62-63) is in no doubt that ‘[c]offee-house conversation was certainly not 
always civil, rational and ordered’, and in the tracts of the satirists like John Starkey 
‘[c]offee-house discussion was repeatedly represented as catastrophically heterodox 
and ill-disciplined, and given to pointless and intemperate debate, swapping ‘diverse 
Monster Opinions and Absurdities’.  Ellis (2004: 63-64) even echoes Starkey in 
speculating that the ‘clamour’ and ‘confused way of gabbling’ typical of the coffee-
house ‘associate[d] it with gossip, conventionally gendered as feminine’, and such a 
claim perhaps throws into different relief Steele’s decision to call his periodical The 
Tatler.  Such a naming arguably gestures to a feminised form of communication, one 
set at some distance from the image of men hard at work in self-serious discoursing 
that energises Habermas (supposedly based at least in part on the reality of Steele’s 
coffee-house based organ The Tatler).  In short, though, much of the empirical 
material covered here – to do with the conjoint spaces and societies of the coffee-
house, all as bound up in a dizzying array of embodied practices, noisily conducted 
conversational tittle-tattle included – does neatly parallel the more abstract lines of 
critique directed above at Habermas’s concept of the public sphere.  At the same time, 
this material infers a rather different set of issues and questions that need to be asked 




Ellis (2002: 6-8) speculates about the informal rules – his ‘twelve principles of 
coffee-house conversation’ – that ought to be oriented to by customers to allow the 
coffee-house to be successful in effectively converting the flowing structure of street 
crowd into the polite (Habermasian) cohort of rational-critical debate.  Rules about 
‘openness to all comers’, about discussion needing to be ‘rational, critical, sceptical, 
polite, calm and reasoned’, about voices not being raised and nobody being brow-
beaten, about topics needing to be ‘relevant, curious, focussed and interesting’, and 
so on: all of these Ellis imagines to have been acknowledged, if not always or even 
often followed.  His key statement, however, can be taken as a launching-off point 
for much that we are attempting in our own research as we seek to understand the 
public life of the café, today’s Starbucks and Caffé Neros included: 
 
These rules I have elaborated in some detail, much of which is worth 
taking with a pinch of salt. Nonetheless, what I want to point to here is 
how the coffee-house established an unstated set of relational group 
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dynamics which allowed it to establish and confirm what it did best, which 
was to create a distinct sociability. In the absence of explicit rules, it was 
able to define a fluid group management process, and use it to encourage 
participation in the congenial and conversational world of the coffee-house 
sociability. This is a lesson that we might apply also to other and similar 
open-context discussions and the sites or institutions that support them. 
Some places are particularly associated with discussion of this kind: places 
where people meet, accidentally or occasionally, where they meet and pass 
the time undisturbed or are able to pass the time together. (Ellis 2002: 7). 
 
Ellis thereby puts an anthropological24 sensibility into the historical claims made by 
Habermas about the transformation of the modern public sphere: he hints at what 
needs to be assumed (as really occurring) for the grosser structural claims to hold 
water; he makes anthropologically strange the ‘polite’ coffee house by showing how 
it could be riotous, criminal and a place of prostitution. 
In this paper we have explored Habermas’s claims about the emergence of a 
bourgeois public sphere in Early Modern Europe, within which the figure of the 
London coffee-house plays an important role both conceptually and empirically.  We 
have demonstrated that Habermas overstates the extent to which coffee-houses were 
relatively contained and egalitarian spaces of calm rational-critical debate, and we 
have proposed that an alternative account is needed: one that inquires into their 
stabilisation of the public and its others, and relatedly of public opinion and its 
alternates, out of the spatial and social fluidity, multiplicity and dissipation of the 
city.  To return to the ethnography avant la lettre with which we began, just as 
Foucault brings to light the many self-serious statements, bureaucratic documents, 
surveys and reports that discipline the population of the state, so these descriptions of 
‘the public’ found in coffee-houses are translations of yet another aspect of the city 
into the records.  Steele, Warde and others like them could for the first time report on 
the public of the city and their opinions.  Since one of the common problems of the 
city is that, unlike the village, opinions that represent it are hard to gather, its 
residents can only be ‘talked to; under special circumstances.  Opinion gatherers 
could stay the day at one coffee-house and have a cross-section of city groups cross 
                                                           
24 Given our aligning of Ellis’s approach to a loosely anthropological one, it is worth quoting at length 
the following: ‘Anthropologists have observed, in many societies people assemble habitually in 
particular places for unstructured social interaction: such as around a well in Medieval France, or a tofu 
shop in post-war Japan, or the porch of a general store in Texas. In each of these places there are no 
[explicit] rules governing their conduct for each participant knows the way to behave there and does 
not tolerate aberrant interlopers. The expected set of behaviour for each community location is in effect 
immanent in the practice of everyday life. For fear of looking odd, or out of place, people learn to obey 
the set of expectations established in each place. This fear of looking abnormal, odd or strange has been 
identified as one of the key ground rules for social behaviour in public and is especially associated with 
urban life according to the sociologist … Goffman. Behaviour in public places like the coffee-house, 
Goffman agues, is governed by the imaginative and creative ways people can act with propriety and 
with the appropriate level of involvement’ (Ellis 2004: 61-62). It might be added that the reference to 
Goffman here, bringing to mind his writing on the ‘performance of everyday life’ (eg. Goffman 1959), 
also ties in with the performative focus of Sennett (1974): see Footnote 17 above. 
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their path, or travel from coffee house to coffee house to drop in on different crowds 
and their conversations.  If we listen to these proto-ethnographers, though, the 
elegance, logic and Reason(ableness) of Habermas’s account in The Structural 
Transformation begin to tarnish, as explained.  All of this, even so, is not to decry 
everything Habermas writes in this important book.  Rather, it is to take his 
provocations very seriously, and to suggest that there is still something valuable in 
his formulations about a public sphere materialised in specific social spaces – a form 
of public space that does enable more than life on the street; a mode of dwelling in 
public with others, particularly personally unknown others, which is civil, broadly 
tolerant and on occasion highly consequential (because of what it said, felt and done 
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